
Subject: A trip down memory lane w/Saddam courtesy of the U.N.

Posted by [sg]theOne on Fri, 21 Mar 2003 14:22:22 GMT

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IAEA Reports to the UN Security Council

<http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports2.html#Consolidated>

UN Resolution 687 -- 1991

<http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/resolutions/res687.pdf>

UN Resolution 1051 -- 1996

<http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/resolutions/res1051.pdf>

UN Resolution 1284 -- 1999

<http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/resolutions/res1284.htm>

IAEA report to UN on 16 October 2002

--THIS IS IN RELATION TO PARAGRAPHS 12 & 13 in Resolution 687 of 1991--

http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/s_2002_1150.pdf

Together with the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), I participated in the second and third rounds of talks

between the Secretary-General and senior representatives of the Government of Iraq. The talks took place

in New York from 1 to 3 May 2002 and in Vienna on 4 and 5 July 2002. The talks provided an opportunity

to clarify with Iraqi officials the requirements for the full implementation of the relevant Security Council

resolutions.

[...etc...]

Following receipt of the letter of 16 September 2002 from the Minister for

Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Secretary-General (S/2002/1034, annex) conveying the decision of Iraq to allow

the return of the United Nations weapons inspectors without conditions,

[...etc...]

Obtaining Iraq's concurrence on those practical arrangements is a crucial step towards the re-establishment

of an effective inspection regime, as required by the relevant resolutions.

[...etc...]

As previously indicated to the Security Council, the greater in-depth analysis

carried out since December 1998 of the extensive documentation acquired through the inspection process has

refined but not changed the Agency's technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and

nuclear-related capabilities as of December 1998. Although there remain a few questions and concerns regarding

Iraq's nuclear programme prior to 1998, the clarification of which would reduce uncertainty as to the completeness

of the Agency's knowledge and understanding of that programme, these questions and concerns do not constitute

"unresolved disarmament issues", as referred to in Security Council resolution 1284 (1999).

The Agency is continuing to review and assess all available post-1998 information (for example, publications by Member States, open-source data and high-resolution commercial satellite imagery) as well as Iraq's recently provided semi-annual declarations. However, as nearly four years have elapsed since IAEA has been able to implement its Security Council mandate in Iraq, the Agency remains unable to draw any conclusions with regard to the status of Iraq's nuclear programme and nuclear-related capabilities as of today. It will therefore be important for the Agency, on recommencement of inspections, to resolve, with the highest priority, the key issue of whether there have been any material changes in Iraq's nuclear activities and capabilities since December 1998, and whether Iraq is in compliance with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

UN Resolution 1284 on Dec. 17th 1999

<http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/resolutions/res1284.htm>

Acknowledging the progress made by Iraq towards compliance with the provisions of resolution 687 (1991), but noting

that, as a result of its failure to implement the relevant Council resolutions fully, the conditions do not exist

which would enable the Council to take a decision pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) to lift the prohibitions referred to in that resolution,

IAEA report to UN on July 21st 1995

--THIS IS IN RELATION Resolutions 687&751 of 1991--

http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/s_1995_604.pdf

(Pages 3 and 4)

Based on the results of these activities and the IAEA's extensive knowledge of Iraq's past programme and present

situation, a large number of errors and inconsistencies have been identified in the documents, typified by the following:

Linguistic correctness and conformity with Iraqi practice:

These documents contain technical wording which differs from that found in the IAEA's extensive database of seized Iraqi documents and terms which are not in conformance with standard Iraqi usage.

Conformity of layout and construction of documents with established Iraqi practices:

The layout of the documents is not consistent with contemporary Iraqi usage. In addition, the documents reveal errors in construction, suggesting poor adaptation of authentic Iraqi documents.

Scientific validity:

Some technical elements of the programme, inferred from the documents,

have been assessed as unlikely by experts from Nuclear Weapon States. Some of those elements are also inconsistent with available information on the status of Iraq's clandestine programme during the last years of the programme.

Accuracy:

Significant inaccuracies in qualifications, titles and names of individuals, as well as in technical and administrative organizational structures, have been clearly established.

As a result of this investigation, the IAEA has reached the conclusion that, on the basis of all evidence available, these documents are not authentic. Furthermore, no credible evidence was found to suggest that the activities reported in these documents were or are being carried out in Iraq.

The investigation undertaken by the IAEA and the basis for its conclusions have been comprehensively documented. In view, however, of the sensitive nature of the subject and of the process, it is considered prudent to keep this documentation confidential.

The IAEA in a report to the UN on April 22nd 1994

--THIS IS IN RELATION TO Resolution 687&751 of 1991--

http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/s_1994_490.pdf

X. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

(pages 7 and

26.

While Iraq has expressed its strong wish for a specific date by which IAEA would submit to the Security Council the report of Iraq's compliance with the relevant paragraphs of resolution 687 (1991), there remain outstanding actions that would need to be completed.

IAEA will have to satisfy itself that it is in a position to implement fully the ongoing monitoring and verification

plan. It is not at this time possible or practical to provide a specific date by which that will happen.

The positive

attitude adopted by the Iraqi authorities since the initiation of the high-level talks in the second half of 1993 is

bearing fruit, should be continued and must be encouraged. This will permit the acceleration of the full implementation

of ongoing monitoring and verification.

Resolution 687 passed in April 8th 1991 states the following in point 12 on page 6.

"...Iraq shall unconditionally agree to not acquire or develop nuclear weapons,

nuclear-weapons-useable material or any

subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; so

submit to the Sec.-Gen. & Director Gen. of the IAEA within fifteen days of the adoption of the present

resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-useable material under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the IAEA."

Iraq's compliance expectations from 1996 concerning the IAEA, you can see in their 2002 report above they've been doing a bang up job.
[http://photos.yahoo.com/bc/aashton@sbcglobal.net/vwp?.dir=/&.dnm=UN+Resolution+1051\(1996\)+Point.jpg&.src=ph&.view=t&.hires=t](http://photos.yahoo.com/bc/aashton@sbcglobal.net/vwp?.dir=/&.dnm=UN+Resolution+1051(1996)+Point.jpg&.src=ph&.view=t&.hires=t)

If it's such a freaking well known fact that Iraq has nothing to do with terrorist why is it in the *1991* resolution ?
<http://photos.yahoo.com/bc/aashton@sbcglobal.net/vwp?.dir=/&.dnm=UN+Resolution+687+Point+H.+32.jpg&.src=ph&.view=t&.hires=t>

FIFTEEN DAYS NOT ALMOST FOUR THOUSAND DAYS
<http://photos.yahoo.com/bc/aashton@sbcglobal.net/vwp?.dir=/&.dnm=UN+Resolution+687+Point+8+and.jpg&.src=ph&.view=t&.hires=t>

The UN -- the running joke on March 19th
Outlining disarmament tasks for Iraq, Blix laments lack of time for inspections

Dr. Hans Blix
19 March – Top United Nations arms inspector Hans Blix today presented a work programme to the Security Council on the key remaining tasks for disarming Iraq, expressing also his sadness that inspections had run out of time and that it appeared war was "imminent."

OH MY GOSH HANS why dont you tell everyone how long YOU HAVE BEEN ON THE CASE ?
The mass media gave ME the impresion that Hanz & the goof troops where new to the situation in Iraq...
the "new UN weapons inspectors". Here is a picture to give everyone a reference point as to how much time Hans has been beating the Inspections drum AND THEY NEVER GOT PAST THE FIRST HALF OF STEP ONE.
<http://photos.yahoo.com/bc/aashton@sbcglobal.net/vwp?.dir=/&.dnm=Hans+=+jerk+off.jpg&.src=ph&.view=t&.hires=t>

Short Version : Saddam lie's and tries to conceal & deceive EVERY group that TRIES to inspect & disarm him
HE DOES NOT WANT TO DISARM ON HIS OWN.
Short Version : The chances of you finding your car filled with 100\$ bills is the same chance of Saddam being in compliance with the UN.

The One
