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| A trip down memory lane w/Saddam courtesy of the U.N. [message #8098] |
Thu, 20 March 2003 03:02  |
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[sg]the0ne
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Registered: February 2003
Location: Houston, TX
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| The U.N.'s UNSCOM Reports to the Security Council |
B. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 707 (1991) AND 715 (1991) --(22 May 1992) [/u]
3. The Secretary-General's report of 7 March 1992 concluded that, despite the vigorous efforts of the Security Council and the Special Commission, Iraq had still not acknowledged its obligations under Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) nor had it provided the full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its proscribed weapons programmes nor the initial declarations required under the plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification. That report also noted that a high-level Iraqi delegation was due to meet the Security Council in the immediate future and that the solution to the matter lay with Iraq.
III. DEVELOPMENTS ---(21 December 1993)
A. Political developments: the attitude of Iraq
10. The fundamental underlying issue for Iraq was its desire to see an end to the first phase of implementation of its obligations under section C of resolution 687 (1991), e.g., the identification and elimination of proscribed weapons and weapons programmes, and for this to be followed by implementation by the Security Council of paragraph 22 of that resolution, i.e., the lifting of the oil embargo, before proceeding to ongoing monitoring and verification activities. Iraq objected to the destruction of the chemicals and equipment on the grounds that they could be redeployed (despite their obvious and direct connection with the chemical weapons programme) and to the installation of the cameras on the grounds that this would, in effect, constitute ongoing monitoring and verification under resolution 715 (1991), a resolution which Iraq had not yet accepted and whose terms, according to Iraq, were still the subject of discussion between Iraq and the Security Council.Instead, Iraq proposed that action on each of these items await the conclusion of a dialogue on all outstanding issues between it and the Special Commission and IAEA.
C. Iraq's declarations ---(24 June 1994)
24. Since its acceptance of resolution 715 (1991), Iraq has sought to address the Commission's concerns on the provision of data, both in relation to the full, final and complete disclosures and in relation to the declarations of current and recent dual-purpose capabilities due under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. There remains some doubt, however, that Iraq is fully cooperating in this regard, particularly as it maintains its claim to have destroyed all documentation and not to be able to recall certain key facts. The lack of documentation continues to present the Commission with the problem of how to verify Iraq's account of its programmes and with the problem of what confidence it can have that it has fully accounted for Iraq's banned capabilities. In this regard, the lack of documentation has been one of the principal delaying factors. That said, there has been a marked change for the better in Iraq's willingness to address the Commission's concerns, particularly in relation to current dual-purpose facilities.
II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ---(10 April 1995)
(a) Possession by the Commission of a full picture of Iraq's past programmes and a full accounting of the facilities, equipment, items and materials associated with those past programmes, in conjunction with full knowledge of the disposition of dual-purpose items currently available to Iraq, the technologies acquired by Iraq in pursuing the past programmes, and the supplier networks it established to acquire those elements of the programmes that it could not acquire indigenously. This information provides the baseline data from which ongoing monitoring and verification proceeds;
[...]
V. CONCLUSIONS
135.As described elsewhere in the present report, the Commission has continued its investigation in all areas of the past proscribed weapons activities in Iraq and its verification of Iraq's declarations. The Commission has come to the conclusion that Iraq has not provided a full and comprehensive disclosure of its past military biological programme or accounted for items and materials acquired for that programme.
With Iraq's failure to account for the use of these items and materials for legitimate purposes, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a high risk that they had been purchased and used for a proscribed purpose - acquisition of biological warfare agent. The Commission will continue its intensive efforts to elucidate all such outstanding issues arising from this and the other past programmes. It notes that, if Iraq decided to provide full, accurate and verifiable information, such matters could be resolved expeditiously.
B. Concealment investigations---(6 October 1997)
102. The Commission has continued its efforts to understand the full extent and status of Iraq's activities directed towards the retention of proscribed materials and capabilities, after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). It has obtained a greater understanding of the actions taken by Iraq to retain such capabilities and thus to seek to deceive the Commission regarding the disposition of weapons. However, considerable uncertainty remains concerning the retention by Iraq of prohibited material and the continued existence of concealment systems.
103. Much of the Commission's efforts during recent months have been directed towards the early actions taken by Iraq to retain prohibited weapons. In a period of several months after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), some weapons and material were presented to the Commission by Iraq. Decisions and attendant actions were also taken, at that time, to retain and conceal other proscribed weapons and materials. The Commission and IAEA have investigated this period intensively in order to establish what organizations, acting under what authorities, were involved.
104. In the context of its concealment investigations, the Commission has two fundamental purposes. The first is to determine if all of the proscribed items that were retained have subsequently been revealed or discovered. The second is to ascertain whether the concealment mechanism that was used, at that time, is still functioning. This latter point bears not only on intrinsic accounting for prohibited weapons and items in Iraq's possession, but also on the ongoing monitoring activities of the Commission.
105. The Commission has established several facts concerning the early decisions by Iraq to withhold certain proscribed weapons and capabilities.
106. For example, it is established that Iraq decided, in April 1991, to divide its missile force into two parts. It would present one part to the Commission for destruction and illegally retain the second part. Iraq claims it subsequently decided to destroy the retained missile force, unilaterally. It was claimed that this unilateral destruction took place in July 1991. The Commission has recently been informed by Iraq, however, that some prohibited weapons and materials were still withheld, even after this unilateral destruction, until October 1991. The Commission has conducted several missions with the objective of determining the full picture of these decisions and actions to include who made the decisions, for what rationale, who was involved in the concealment and when and where subsequent destruction decisions were taken. This information is needed in order to be able to verify fully the facts with respect to Iraq's proscribed missile capability.
IV. COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Issues of substance
122. Three weapons areas are at issue - missiles, chemical weapons and biological weapons.
Missiles
123. Significant progress has been achieved in the missile area. The Commission is now in a position to be able to account for practically all, except two, imported combat missiles that were once the core of Iraq's proscribed missile force. The Commission has also accounted for all declared operational missile launchers, both imported and indigenously produced. To achieve the ultimate objective of full disposal of Iraq's proscribed operational missile assets, the next important step is to account for proscribed missile warheads. This is of particular importance as the issue overlaps the chemical and biological weapons areas. Once this is accomplished, the Commission's ability to report to the Security Council with confidence that Iraq does not possess a proscribed missile force would greatly increase. Remaining issues, such as accounting for missile propellants, would not be insurmountable if Iraq would cooperate with the Commission and provide the evidence required to complete the process of verification. More work is still required to achieve the same results in the area of Iraq's indigenous production of proscribed missile systems.
Chemical weapons
124. Important progress has been made in this area, of which the recently completed destruction of chemical weapons-related equipment and materials is an example. However, the ability of the Commission to report positively on disarmament of this category of weapons of mass destruction will require the provision by Iraq of much more and accurate material and related access by the Commission relevant to the warheads and VX questions.
Biological weapons
125. This is an area that is unredeemed by progress or any approximation of the known facts of Iraq's programme. The Executive Chairman and UNSCOM experts have made clear repeatedly to their Iraqi counterparts their deep concern about this area, both intrinsically and in terms of its impact upon the overall estimation of Iraq's willingness to abide by the decisions of the Security Council.
126. There is incomprehension of why Iraq is persisting so strongly with both refusing to make the facts known about its biological weapons programme and why it is so insistent on blocking the Commission's own efforts to reach those facts.
127. This perspective on Iraq's biological weapons programme is not the Commission's alone. As is indicated in this report, independent international experts have the same view.
UNSCOM
Reports to the Security Council
25 January 1999
ANNEX D
ACTIONS BY IRAQ TO OBSTRUCT DISARMAMENT
1. The history of the Special Commission's work in Iraq has been plagued by coordinated efforts to thwart full discovery of Iraq's proscribed programmes. These policies and actions began immediately following the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It is against this backdrop that the significant positive and negative results described in the weapons annexes should be seen. What follows is a brief summary of the Commission's current understanding of the evolution of these concealment policies and practices.
2. Immediately following the Gulf war, the Iraqi Presidency collected reports on weapons remaining with Iraq's Armed Forces after the war, including its weapons prohibited by recently adopted resolution 687(1991). Such documents were provided to the Presidency in the spring of 1991. A decision was taken by a high-level committee (one of whose members was Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Tariq Aziz) to provide to the Commission only a portion of its proscribed weapons, their components and production capabilities and stocks. The policy, as deduced from a range of evidence available to the Commission including the initial false Iraq's declarations, was based on the following Iraqi actions:
-- provide a portion of their extant weapon stocks, with an emphasis on those, which were least modern.
-- retain production capability and the "know-how" documentation necessary to revive programmes when possible
-- conceal the full extent of chemical weapons programmes, including its VX project, and retain production equipment and raw materials
-- conceal the number and type of BW and CW warheads for proscribed missiles
-- conceal indigenous long-range missile production, and retain production capabilities, specifically with respect to guidance systems and missile engines
-- conceal the very existence of its offensive biological weapons programme and retain all production capabilities
3. Iraq had initial success in much of its concealment efforts, but, based, presumably, on early experience with the IAEA and the Special Commission in inspection activities, Iraq, took a subsequent decision in late June of 1991 to eliminate some of these retained proscribed materials, on its own, and in secret and in such a way that precise knowledge about what and how much had been destroyed would not be achievable. This decision and action by the high-level committee was a so-called "unilateral destruction". It was taken following an incident in June 1991 when IAEA inspectors, following an inspection that turned confrontational at Abu Ghraib, obtained photographic evidence of retained nuclear weapons production components.
4. Iraq did not admit to its illegal unilateral destruction until March 1992, approximately nine months after the destruction activities, and even then only after the Commission indicated it had evidence that Iraq retained weapons after its supervised destruction. Iraq states that "The unilateral destruction was carried out entirely unrecorded. No written and no visual records were kept, as it was not foreseen that Iraq needed to prove the destruction to anybody." Such an approach also indicates that Iraq intended to pursue a policy of concealment in its relations with the Commission and the IAEA."
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Sorry for the long quote but I feel like it drives the point home. For those of you who didn't read it let me give you the jist.
1991-We don't know what Iraq has but we sure wish they'd tell us
1993-We sure wish 2years later we could get past the 1st phase of "identification & elimination"
1994-Iraq says they destroyed all this stuff but no one took any notes, we don't really believe them but man have they been a willing bunch lately!
1995-Fours years later we are still trying to pass the 1st phase of "identification". We don't know what Iraq has but we sure wish they'd tell us
1997-Iraq still hasn't completed the 1st phase of "identification" & we know they are trying to hold on to it.
1999-We know Iraq lied about :
****full extent of weapons stock (they'd 'declare' the weakest ones)
****intending to disarm
****chem weapons stock (VX retention raw materials + prod. capabilities)
****chem/bio warheads
****total concealment of the "full extent of chemical weapons programmes"
****conceal the very existence of its offensive biological weapons programme and retain all production capabilities
****conceal indigenous long-range missile production
2003-"We don't know what Iraq has but we sure wish they'd tell us" & "but man have they been a willing bunch lately!"
This last report posted 1999 and had an EIGHT YEAR TRACK RECORD of similar activities. For EIGHT YEARS Iraq deceived the IRON GRIP ON REALITY of the UN in reference to every major weapons program they had (that WE'VE found out about thus far).
So I do beg the question, again...what are these other options you think we have?
So I do beg the question, what do you think Saddam wants to do with a LONG RANGE MISSLE PROGRAM & CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL/NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES ?
Isn't this helpful ? You'll note several of the statements above are still echoing on today, discovery of long range missiles etc. Or do we need a web cam w/Saddam standing in front of a big fucking sign saying.."I want to kill you in the worst way." before everyone believes it.
So old chap, shall we disarm him before or after the mad man goes nuclear?
*ZIP Forward to the present*
So how much longer would you like to give Iraq to re-arm ? Shall we give him another 12years so he can be in the nuclear club when we go to disarm him ?
But somehow IM THE SADIST BRAINWASHED WAR-MONGER JERKOFF FUCK HEAD who is dying to kill some Iraqi's. Two points
a) I don't want to kill Iraqi's
b) Saddam had already taken that position.
You can continue to quote Michael More author of "Stupid White Men" & "Bowling for Columbine" plus the Dixie Chicks if you like. I on the other side of the coin will chose to quote the U.N. and other reputable sources of information.
And it is absolutely amazing that a)the U.N. require yet ANOTHER RESOLUTION to specificly write out in MULTIFUCKING COLORED CRAYONS what military action needs to be taken b)the U.N. security councel would veto any resolution that addresses this issue.
The One
ps. Duke of Nukes - this is one of those bowls full of facts you requested.
yahoo : chapstic25
aim : lamant281
[Updated on: Thu, 20 March 2003 06:45] Report message to a moderator |
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| A trip down memory lane w/Saddam courtesy of the U.N. [message #8133] |
Thu, 20 March 2003 07:30  |
eggmac
Messages: 51
Registered: February 2003
Karma: 0
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Recruit |
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Globalpolicy:
"In a fundamental change of policy, the Bush administration has embraced the doctrine of preemptive war, including the first strike use of nuclear weapons, and is now applying it to Iraq. Speaking in Davos, Switerland, on 26 January 2003, US Secretary of State, Colin L. Powell, said: "We continue to reserve our sovereign right to take military action against Iraq alone or in a coalition of the willing . . ."
There is no such unqualified sovereign right. On the contrary, as a member state of the United Nations, the US is obliged by law to pursue peaceful means in international relations, as stated in the UN Charter, Chapter 1, Article 2:
"All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered; and, All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
The UN Charter does recognize the use of unilateral military force by a member state, but only for purposes of self defense and only when an "armed attack" has occured against that state, as stated in Chapter 7, Article 51 of the UN Charter:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
Iraq has not been shown to have carried out "an armed attack" on the United States. No evidence has been offered that assigns any responsibility to Iraq for the attacks on the United States made on 11 September 2001, or any other attacks. Iraq has not been shown to be a credible threat to the US.
Possession of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq, weapons already widely distributed among many countries, does not constitute an "armed attack" on anyone; nor does it justify unilaterial US military action. If such weapons are a threat to its neighbors or anyone else, including the US, this is a matter for UN action, not unilateral American military action outside the UN.
Iraq may have links to Al Queda, but this too does not constitute an "armed attack" on anyone. If such links constitute a serious threat, this too is a matter for UN action, not for unilateral American action.
A US attack against Iraq, absent evidence of an Iraqi armed attack against the US, would violate international law and render the UN impotent. It would promote the US as world dictator, accountable to no one, with inevitable resentment abroad. Such a US attack might someday be determined a war crime, and those with authority to carry out such attacks, war criminals.
The US must respect international law and work through the United Nations to resolve international disputes, and not act unilaterally to impose its own will on the world. If the US is unhappy with decision-makiing at the UN, it should work to make that organization more democratic and accountable.
The US has been the only superpower since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. It could have used its power during that period to strengthen international institutions and establish a more responsible global democratic system, but under both Democratic and Republican administrations it chose not to do so."
As to Saddam Hussein being a war criminal:
"Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.-UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights", Article 10
Center for Economic and Social Right:
"War against Iraq is "unequivocally illegal under the UN Charter and international law generally", according to a new report. The report rejects efforts by the U.S., U.K, and Australia to circumvent the U.N. Security Council and claim legal justification from past resolutions."
Rahul Mahajan:
"The majority of the antiwar movement has made a mistake in emphasizing the unilateral nature of the war on Iraq and the need for United Nations approval, and we may well reap the consequences of that mistake.
The argument has made major inroads with the public; polls consistently show that the majority of Americans oppose a unilateral war without international support and the latest poll in Britain shows only 15% of the population supports a war without a second U.N. resolution.
It's also an entirely unobjectionable argument in a negative sense - without a Security Council resolution, the war is clearly a violation of international law, as U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has recently pointed out. It is, however, possible for a war fought with U.N. approval still to be a violation of international law.
That is the fundamental question -- not whether our "allies" support us, not whether we can strong-arm and browbeat enough members of the Security Council to acquiesce, but whether or not the war is illegal.
Interestingly, in this, as in so many other things, the Bush administration turns this question on its head and claims that the war is necessary in order to uphold international law.
Let's start with that argument.
Iraq is threatening no country with aggression and its violations of Security Council resolutions, while clear, are technical, mostly a matter of providing incomplete documentation about weapons that may or may not exist, and for the use of which there are no apparent plans. At the same time, Israel is in violation of, at a very conservative count, over 30 resolutions, pertaining among other things to the very substantive issue of the continuing illegal occupation of another people, along with violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention through steady encroachment on and effective annexation of that land. Indonesia, another U.S. ally, violated U.N. resolutions for a quarter of a century in East Timor with relative impunity. Morocco is illegally occupying Western Sahara. In each of these cases, the United States wouldn't be required to go to war to help uphold international law; it could start simply by terminating aid and arms sales to these countries.
The United States is also a very odd country to claim to uphold such a principle. Ever since a 1986 International Court of Justice ruling against the United States and in favor of Nicaragua, the United States has refused to acknowledge the ICJ's authority (the $17 billion in damages it was ordered to pay were never delivered). Shortly after that judgment, the United States actually vetoed a Security Council resolution calling on states to respect international law. Of course, the United States doesn't itself violate Security Council resolutions, since it can always veto them -- as it did when the Security Council tried to condemn its blatantly illegal invasion of Panama in 1989, and on seven occasions regarding its contra war on Nicaragua.
For the sake of argument, let's forget about the international double standard and focus just on Iraq. Even without reference to anything else, one can argue that repeated U.S. violations of international law when it comes to Iraq and in particular of the specific "containment" regime instituted after the Gulf War release Iraq from any obligations.
To start, Iraq has been under illegal attack for the past decade, with numerous bombings including the Desert Fox campaign, even as it was being called on to start obeying international law.
The United States also took numerous illegal or questionably legal steps to subvert the legal regime of "containment" -- passing the "Iraq Liberation Act" in October 1998, which provided $97 million for groups trying to overthrow the Iraqi government, a clear violation of Iraqi sovereignty and a violation of international law; stating that only with regime change would the sanctions be lifted, in violation of UNSCR 687; and using weapons inspections to commit espionage, the information from which was then used in targeting decisions during Desert Fox.
Is the War Itself a Violation of International Law?
Perhaps the most cogent argument, however, is the fact that the war the United States is planning on Iraq is an act of premeditated aggression.
All the signs point in the same direction.
First, in August, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld ordered that the list of bombing targets be extended far beyond any goal of enforcing the no-fly zones to include command-and-control centers and in general to go beyond simple reaction to threats. According to John Pike of Globalsecurity.org, this was "part of their strategy of going ahead and softening up the air defenses now" to prepare for war later. By December 2002, the shift could be noted in a 300% increase in ordnance dropped per threat detected -- a clear sign that simply defending the overflights was no longer the primary aim of the bombings. According to the Guardian, "Whitehall officials have admitted privately that the 'no-fly' patrols, conducted by RAF and US aircraft from bases in Kuwait, are designed to weaken Iraq's air defence systems and have nothing to do with their stated original purpose." Weakening air defense and command-and-control are the standard first steps in all U.S. wars since 1991, so the first salvoes in the war were being fired even as inspections continued. In the first two months of this year, bombings occurred almost every other day.
Even worse, according to strategic analyst Michael Klare, by February 2002 it had become clear that all of the administration's supposed diplomatic activities in the Fall of 2002 and early 2003 had merely been a smokescreen.
The war was being seriously planned from at least the spring of 2002, but in the summer there was a serious internal debate in the military between a so-called "Afghan option" with 50-75,000 troops and heavy reliance on air power and Iraqi opposition forces and the eventual plan, "Desert Storm lite," with 200-250,000 troops and a full-scale invasion.
The decision was made in late August, but the more involved plan, according to Klare, required at least a six-month deployment. Ever since then, the timetable has not been one of diplomacy, U.N. resolutions, and weapons inspections, but rather one of deployment, strong-arming of regional allies needed as staging areas for the invasion, and, quite likely, replenishment of stocks of precision weapons depleted in the war on Afghanistan.
For over a month, as inspections increase in effectiveness and scope, as Iraq dismantles its al-Samoud missiles, and as it struggles desperately to find ways to reconcile questions over biological and chemical agents, the White House has contemptuously dismissed all efforts. The constant refrain is that time is running out, with no explanation of why the time is so limited. The reason is simple; it's not because of any imminent threat from Iraq, it's just because the troops are there and ready to go.
The obvious conclusion is that the war was decided on long ago, irrespective of Iraq's actions. Nothing Iraq could have done short of full-scale capitulation and "regime change" would have stopped the United States from going to war. That makes this war a clear case of aggression.
Even the fig leaf of another U.N. Security Council resolution will not change this fact. Nor will it confer any legitimacy on the actions, because of the massive attempts by the United States, documented in the study "Coalition of the Willing or Coalition of the Coerced?" by the Institute for Policy Studies, to coerce, bribe, and otherwise exert undue influence on other countries, including key undecided Security Council members, to support the U.S. position.
Above all else, if other countries acquiesce to U.S. plans, it will be because of the constant refrain of the Bush administration -- that the United States will go to war with or without their consent, so there is nothing to be gained (and much to be lost) by resisting.
In fact, the U.S. war on Iraq is itself the most fundamental violation of international law. In the language coined at the Nuremberg trials, it is a crime against peace. Former Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, chief U.S. prosecutor at the first Nuremberg trial, called waging aggressive war "the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole."
It surely is unprecedented in world history that a country is under escalating attack; told repeatedly that it will be subjected to a full-scale war; required to disarm itself before that war; and then castigated by the "international community" for significant but partial compliance."
Collin Powel's Biography
Michael Albert:
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If war comes even despite the historic, tenacious, and comprehensive opposition now raging across the planet, the U.S. government will proclaim triumphantly that everyone who isn’t a traitor needs to rally around Washington to “support our troops.” Opponents of the war could opt for many possible replies.
We could point out that our troops in Iraq are barely in danger at all because they are assaulting a tenth-rate opponent that has no serious means to defend Iraq much less to attack the world’s sole superpower.
We could point out that while perhaps a few hundred U.S. troops will die in this war, way over 50,000 U.S. citizens will die in the next 12 months due to workplace accidents and death by industry-caused diseases and automobile accidents (not to mention the impact of pollution and unsafe products). We could then query why this massive yearly blight on our population, roughly 15 times as devastating as 9/11, doesn’t provoke a war on corporations’ profit-seeking violations of their employees’ and consumers’ health and safety.
Or we could point out that the lives of American troops are no more worthy of compassionate support than the lives of Iraqis, and that we didn’t kill Hussein a million times over with our decade-long sanctions but we instead killed a million Iraqis once each -- with Hussein getting stronger as each new corpse was added to the carnage.
And of course we could explain how unleashing a campaign to “shock and awe” a country is unjust and immoral, how it is an archetype example of the terrorism we say we are against.
But for myself, I think that perhaps a different approach might work better, and so if war does come, I intend to reply to the demand to support our troops by saying that yes, I too “support our troops.”
I will reply that I support our troops not having to kill people in Iraq.
I support our troops not being ordered to assault defenseless populations, towns, farms, and the infrastructural sinews of life that sustain a whole country’s citizenry.
I support our troops not having to carry out orders from Commander in Chief George Bush and then having to live the rest of their lives wondering why they obeyed such a barbaric buffoon rather than resisting his illegitimate, immoral authority.
And for the same reason, I support the Pope and the Dalai Lama going to Iraq in the place of our troops, as human shields and also to aid those Iraqis who have already suffered under our sanctions and bombs as well as under the violence of Hussein who was, of course, previously the recipient of U.S. military aid and even U.S. guidance in his horrible undertakings.
In fact, I support all rabbis and priests and other moral leaders going to Iraq as human shields – and all past Noble Peace Prize winners -- and all past winners of any big peace or humanitarian prize at all, anywhere -- and heads of state, for that matter.
I support our troops not dying in Iraq figuratively or literally, physically or psychologically. I support our troops coming home with their hearts not broken, retaining humanity and compassion essential to feeling true solidarity with those who confront tyrannical behavior abroad, or right here in the U.S. with its 30 million tyrannized poor.
I support our troops coming home with their minds ravenous to comprehend what is wrong with war for empire, what is wrong with war to obliterate international law, what is wrong with war to control oil and use it as a bludgeon against allies and enemies alike, what is wrong with war for profit, what is wrong with war to intimidate whole nations and continents, what is wrong with war to subordinate a planet and even to test and trumpet the tools of war.
What must it do to one’s mind and soul to engage as a soldier in a war in which the enemy is defenseless, in which the motives of one’s leaders are vile, and in which one’s own say over the events is nil?
I support our troops refusing to kill on behalf of politicians and profiteers. I support our troops rebelling against orders, not obeying them. I support our troops rejecting reasons of state. And I support our troops coming home to where their real battle is.
We must battle to reinvest our society with aspirations for justice and equality and with respect for diversity, solidarity, and self-management.
We must battle to eliminate the scourge of private ownership that makes a few people as rich as whole populations and that leaves many people less rich than the pets of profiteers.
We must battle to totally eradicate the racism and sexism that denigrate whole sectors of the population, to free sexuality and culture, to free creativity, and to sustain the environment.
Bush tells us to bomb Iraq on grounds Iraq may have bombs. He tells us to bomb Iraq on grounds Iraq curtails freedoms. He tells us to bomb Iraq on grounds Iraq may be abetting terrorism.
What then should we do about a country that has by far the most bombs in the world and that uses them most widely—and that brags about it shamelessly?
What should we do about a country that is currently curtailing freedoms abroad and moving to do so at home with a dangerously escalating vigor—and that brags about it shamelessly?
And what should we do about a country that is producing terrorism most aggressively – both terrorism directed at others and also terrorism which will be unleashed against us in reply—and that brags about it shamelessly.
What should we do about the U.S.? We should curtail its belligerency, change its regime, and fundamentally revolutionize its centers of wealth and power.
Support our troops, bring them home.
Support our troops, provide them housing.
Support our troops, provide them health care.
Support our troops, provide them socially valuable jobs.
Turn military bases into industrial centers for the production of low cost housing, schools, hospitals, daycare centers, rail lines, inner city parks, and other social and public goods that can enrich rather than snuff out life.
Support our troops and one day they will join the fight for unlimited justice for all.
Support our troops."
NYT:
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There are now two super powers in the world, the New York Times told its readers, after the February 15th demonstrations.
On one side there is the U.S. military machine. On the other side, there is international public opinion.
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again for you:
United Nations Chapter 7 Article 51
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security
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United Nations Chapter 1 Article 2
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All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered; and, All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
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| A trip down memory lane w/Saddam courtesy of the U.N. [message #8138] |
Thu, 20 March 2003 07:45 |
KIRBY098
Messages: 1546
Registered: February 2003
Karma: 0
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General (1 Star) |
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How does Slobodan Milosevich fit into this framework? His crime are currently being tried in the war crimes tribunal, which is internationaly mediated. He wouldn't be being prosecuted right now, if it weren't for the United States forcing his hand, and removing his ability to make war. HIS people turned him over, and it turns out the world has a valid case against him. The United States and NATO were proven correct in the end despite international criticism. Do you feel action in this instance was justified?
Deleted
[Updated on: Thu, 20 March 2003 13:15] Report message to a moderator |
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| A trip down memory lane w/Saddam courtesy of the U.N. [message #8144] |
Thu, 20 March 2003 08:03 |
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[sg]the0ne
Messages: 442
Registered: February 2003
Location: Houston, TX
Karma: 0
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Commander |
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I'd love to respond to all that right away (which I suspect some of which but lets try to focus on one topic in particular. A topic you managed to miss was Iraq's clear pattern of concealment & deception. In your 318 paragraphs comprised of 3304 (roughly) words I dont think I saw you cover the IMPORTANT part of the Iraqi's resolution violation.
I would like to address one HUMOROUS note ... allow me :
| eggmac |
The obvious conclusion is that the war was decided on long ago, irrespective of Iraq's actions. Nothing Iraq could
have done short of full-scale capitulation and "regime change" would have stopped the United States from going to war.
That makes this war a clear case of aggression.
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Quiet right by the time frame this section refers to that was around when we 'went' to Afgan. ? So that means Saddam had over a decade to disarm, right?
| eggmac |
[etc...]and as it[Iraq] struggles desperately to find ways to reconcile questions over biological and chemical agents, the White House has contemptuously
dismissed all efforts. The constant refrain is that time is running out, with no explanation of why the time is so limited. The reason
is simple; it's not because of any imminent threat from Iraq, it's just because the troops are there and ready to go.
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Your right again ! George is just *dying* to get back to killing folks...ever since he -stole- the presidency you know.[/sarcasm]
Here's a tip for those tricky questions about bio./chem. agents...stop fucking lying.
| The U.N. club house |
UNSCOM
Reports to the Security Council
25 January 1999
ANNEX D
ACTIONS BY IRAQ TO OBSTRUCT DISARMAMENT
1. The history of the Special Commission's work in Iraq has been plagued by coordinated efforts to thwart
full discovery of Iraq's proscribed programmes. These policies and actions began immediately following the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It is against this backdrop that the significant positive and negative results described in the weapons annexes should be seen. What follows is a brief summary of the Commission's current understanding of the evolution of these concealment policies and practices.
2. Immediately following the Gulf war, the Iraqi Presidency collected reports on weapons remaining with Iraq's
Armed Forces after the war, including its weapons prohibited by recently adopted resolution 687(1991). Such documents
were provided to the Presidency in the spring of 1991. A decision was taken by a high-level committee (one of whose members
was Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Tariq Aziz) to provide to the Commission only a portion of its proscribed weapons, their
components and production capabilities and stocks. The policy, as deduced from a range of evidence available to the
Commission including the initial false Iraq's declarations, was based on the following Iraqi actions:
-- provide a portion of their extant weapon stocks, with an emphasis on those, which were least modern.
-- retain production capability and the "know-how" documentation necessary to revive programmes when possible
-- conceal the full extent of chemical weapons programmes, including its VX project, and retain production equipment and raw materials
-- conceal the number and type of BW and CW warheads for proscribed missiles
-- conceal indigenous long-range missile production, and retain production capabilities, specifically with respect to guidance systems and missile engines
-- conceal the very existence of its offensive biological weapons programme and retain all production capabilities
3. Iraq had initial success in much of its concealment efforts, but, based, presumably, on early experience
with the IAEA and the Special Commission in inspection activities, Iraq, took a subsequent decision in late June of
1991 to eliminate some of these retained proscribed materials, on its own, and in secret and in such a way that
precise knowledge about what and how much had been destroyed would not be achievable. This decision and action by
the high-level committee was a so-called "unilateral destruction". It was taken following an incident in June 1991
when IAEA inspectors, following an inspection that turned confrontational at Abu Ghraib, obtained photographic
evidence of retained nuclear weapons production components.
4. Iraq did not admit to its illegal unilateral destruction until March 1992, approximately nine months
after the destruction activities, and even then only after the Commission indicated it had evidence that Iraq retained
weapons after its supervised destruction. Iraq states that "The unilateral destruction was carried out entirely
unrecorded. No written and no visual records were kept, as it was not foreseen that Iraq needed to prove the destruction
to anybody." Such an approach also indicates that Iraq intended to pursue a policy of concealment in its
relations with the Commission and the IAEA."
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Next time before you Copy»Paste from whateve website that was try reviewing my *presonally* selected material. Instead of something found under Fundamentalist»Rhetoric. I have reviewed a suffiecient amount of the data MYSELF and come to my own conclusions and expessed my conclusions alone here...unlike youself.
Poor Iraq being bullied on by some bad people who are talking about some "checmical" weapons and Saddams just setting there shaking his fucking stupid head..."oh no...we dont have any chemical weapons...". So like I said *read* my post before you do the Copy»Paste thing next time.
Thanks,
The One
yahoo : chapstic25
aim : lamant281
[Updated on: Sat, 22 March 2003 16:09] Report message to a moderator |
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| A trip down memory lane w/Saddam courtesy of the U.N. [message #8440] |
Fri, 21 March 2003 07:22 |
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[sg]the0ne
Messages: 442
Registered: February 2003
Location: Houston, TX
Karma: 0
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Commander |
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IAEA Reports to the UN Security Council
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports2.html#Consolidated
UN Resolution 687 -- 1991
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/resolutions/res687.pdf
UN Resolution 1051 -- 1996
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/resolutions/res1051.pdf
UN Resolution 1284 -- 1999
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/resolutions/res1284.htm
| IAEA report to UN on 16 October 2002 |
--THIS IS IN RELATION TO PARAGRAPHS 12 & 13 in Resolution 687 of 1991--
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/s_2002_1150.pdf
Together with the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), I participated in the second and third rounds of talks
between the Secretary-General and senior representatives of the Government of Iraq. The talks took place
in New York from 1 to 3 May 2002 and in Vienna on 4 and 5 July 2002. The talks provided an opportunity
to clarify with Iraqi officials the requirements for the full implementation of the relevant Security Council
resolutions.
[...etc...]
Following receipt of the letter of 16 September 2002 from the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Secretary-General (S/2002/1034, annex) conveying the decision of Iraq to allow
the return of the United Nations weapons inspectors without conditions,
[...etc...]
Obtaining Iraq’s concurrence on those practical arrangements is a crucial step towards the re-establishment
of an effective inspection regime, as required by the relevant resolutions.
[...etc...]
As previously indicated to the Security Council, the greater in-depth analysis
carried out since December 1998 of the extensive documentation acquired through the inspection process has
refined but not changed the Agency’s technically coherent picture of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme and
nuclear-related capabilities as of December 1998. Although there remain a few questions and concerns regarding
Iraq’s nuclear programme prior to 1998, the clarification of which would reduce uncertainty as to the completeness
of the Agency’s knowledge and understanding of that programme, these questions and concerns do not constitute
“unresolved disarmament issues”, as referred to in Security Council resolution 1284 (1999).
The Agency is continuing to review and assess all available post-1998
information (for example, publications by Member States, open-source data and high-resolution commercial
satellite imagery) as well as Iraq’s recently provided semi-annual declarations. However, as nearly four
years have elapsed since IAEA has been able to implement its Security Council mandate in Iraq, the Agency
remains unable to draw any conclusions with regard to the status of Iraq’s nuclear programme and nuclear-related
capabilities as of today. It will therefore be important for the Agency, on recommencement of inspections,
to resolve, with the highest priority, the key issue of whether there have been any material changes in Iraq’s
nuclear activities and capabilities since December 1998, and whether Iraq is in compliance with its obligations
under the relevant Security Council resolutions.
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| UN Resolution 1284 on Dec. 17th 1999 |
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/resolutions/res1284.htm
Acknowledging the progress made by Iraq towards compliance with the provisions of resolution 687 (1991), but noting
that, as a result of its failure to implement the relevant Council resolutions fully, the conditions do not exist
which would enable the Council to take a decision pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) to lift the prohibitions
referred to in that resolution,
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| IAEA report to UN on July 21st 1995 |
--THIS IS IN RELATION Resolutions 687&751 of 1991--
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/s_1995_604.pdf
(Pages 3 and 4)
Based on the results of these activities and the IAEA’s extensive knowledge of Iraq’s past programme and present
situation, a large number of errors and inconsistencies have been identified in the documents, typified by the following:
Linguistic correctness and conformity with Iraqi practice:
These documents contain technical wording which differs from that
found in the IAEA’s extensive database of seized Iraqi documents and terms which are not in conformance with
standard Iraqi usage.
Conformity of layout and construction of documents with established
Iraqi practices:
The layout of the documents is not consistent with contemporary Iraqi
usage. In addition, the documents reveal errors in construction,
suggesting poor adaptation of authentic Iraqi documents.
Scientific validity:
Some technical elements of the programme, inferred from the documents,
have been assessed as unlikely by experts from Nuclear Weapon States.
Some of those elements are also inconsistent with available
information on the status of Iraq's clandestine programme during the last years of the programme.
Accuracy:
Significant inaccuracies in qualifications, titles and names of
individuals, as well as in technical and administrative organizational
structures, have been clearly established.
As a result of this investigation, the IAEA has reached the conclusion
that, on the basis of all evidence available, these documents are not authentic. Furthermore,
no credible evidence was found to suggest that the activities reported in these
documents were or are being carried out in Iraq.
The investigation undertaken by the IAEA and the basis for its conclusions
have been comprehensively documented. In view, however, of the sensitive nature of the subject and of the process, it is
considered prudent to keep this documentation confidential.
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| The IAEA in a report to the UN on April 22nd 1994 |
--THIS IS IN RELATION TO Resolution 687&751 of 1991--
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/s_1994_490.pdf
X. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
(pages 7 and 
26.
While Iraq has expressed its strong wish for a specific date by which IAEA
would submit to the Security Council the report of Iraq’s compliance with the
relevant paragraphs of resolution 687 (1991), there remain outstanding actions that would need to be completed.
IAEA will have to satisfy itself that it is in a position to implement fully the ongoing monitoring and verification
plan. It is not at this time possible or practical to provide a specific date by which that will happen. The positive
attitude adopted by the Iraqi authorities since the initiation of the high-level talks in the second half of 1993 is
bearing fruit, should be continued and must be encouraged. This will permit the acceleration of the full implementation
of ongoing monitoring and verification.
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Resolution 687 passed in April 8th1991 states the following in point 12 on page 6.
"...Iraq shall undonditionally agree to not aquire or develop nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapos-useable material or any
subsystems or components or any research, developement, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; so
submit to the Sec.-Gen. & Director Gen. of the IAEA within fifteen days of the adoption of the present
resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place
all of it's nuclear-weapons-useable material under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the IAEA."
Iraq's compliance expectations from 1996 concerning the IAEA, you can see in their 2002 report above they've
been doing a bang up job.
http://photos.yahoo.com/bc/aashton@sbcglobal.net/vwp?.dir=/&.dnm=UN+Resolution+1051(1996)+Point.jpg&.src=ph&.view=t&.hires=t
If it's such a freaking well known fact that Iraq has nothing to do with terrorist why is it in the *1991* resolution ?
http://photos.yahoo.com/bc/aashton@sbcglobal.net/vwp?.dir=/&.dnm=UN+Resolution+687+Point+H.+32.jpg&.src=ph&.view=t&.hires=t
FIFTEEN DAYS NOT ALMOST FOUR THOUSAND DAYS
http://photos.yahoo.com/bc/aashton@sbcglobal.net/vwp?.dir=/&.dnm=UN+Resolution+687+Point+8+and.jpg&.src=ph&.view=t&.hires=t
| The UN -- the running joke on March 19th |
Outlining disarmament tasks for Iraq, Blix laments lack of time for inspections
Dr. Hans Blix
19 March – Top United Nations arms inspector Hans Blix today presented a work programme to the Security Council on the
key remaining tasks for disarming Iraq, expressing also his sadness that inspections had run out of time and that
it appeared war was "imminent."
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OH MY GOSH HANS why dont you tell everyone how long YOU HAVE BEEN ON THE CASE ?
The mass media gave ME the impresion that Hanz & the goof troops where new to the situation in Iraq...
the "new UN weapons inspectors". Here is a picture to give everyone a reference point as to how much time Hans
has been beating the Inspections drum AND THEY NEVER GOT PAST THE FIRST HALF OF STEP ONE.
http://photos.yahoo.com/bc/aashton@sbcglobal.net/vwp?.dir=/&.dnm=Hans+=+jerk+off.jpg&.src=ph&.view=t&.hires=t
Short Version : Saddam lie's and tries to conceal & deceive EVERY group that TRIES to inspect & disarm him
HE DOES NOT WANT TO DISARM ON HIS OWN.
Short Version : The chances of you finding your car filled with 100$ bills is the same chance of Saddam
being in compliance with the UN.
The One
yahoo : chapstic25
aim : lamant281
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